The most useful comments sharpened the risk from "creepy surveillance" into something more operational. The immediate problem is not futuristic facial recognition. It is that Flock turns messy, stale law enforcement data into real-time traffic stops. Several people said the dangerous failure mode is a bad
hotlist hit, not a Hollywood-style dragnet. A plate reported stolen and later cleared can still trigger an armed stop days later if the source system was never built for instant sensor-driven enforcement. That made the thread land on a blunt point: once you automate searches and lower the cost of querying, old data quality problems become public-safety problems.
A second theme was that Flock is not uniquely alarming because it invented
ALPR. People with direct experience kept saying the bigger shift is packaging commodity camera and
computer vision tech into a national, searchable service that municipalities and private property owners can share with police. That setup sidesteps a lot of the friction, oversight, and legal scrutiny a city-run surveillance buildout would normally trigger. It also means a city canceling a contract does not necessarily remove the cameras from local life if retailers, parking lots, or landlords keep feeding the network.
The mood was strongly hostile to Flock, but not fatalistic. The strongest practical advice was local. Multiple commenters pointed to city council fights, public-records requests, and contract reviews as the place where opposition has actually won. At the same time, people who have worked these campaigns warned against leaning on speculative worst cases when the concrete ones are already enough. The persuasive case is false stops, weak audit trails, expansive private-public data sharing, and a product that makes mass querying cheap and routine.