Welcoming the Nepalese Government to Have I Been Pwned

The sharper discussion came from people with experience using Nepali government systems. They described a grim baseline. Passport booking apparently breaks unless you force the browser timezone to Asia/Kathmandu. More serious claims went further, including endpoints that lacked basic input sanitization and could expose biometric data, plus reports of vulnerabilities left open because they were useful for corruption. The practical read was simple. Nepal joining a breach-monitoring service is good, but it sits far downstream from the more urgent problem, which is weak application security and brittle operational competence. That broadened into a more general point about government IT in parts of Asia and Africa. Several comments argued that severe data exposure is often visible just through ordinary use, without any real probing. One person said they avoid reporting obvious flaws because interacting with state systems can create personal risk. Another pushed the opposite view, saying public incidents and external tooling can give reformers inside government the evidence they need, especially if criminal groups or foreign intelligence services have likely been exploiting the same weaknesses quietly for years. A separate tangent fixated on Cloudflare’s captcha and bot checks, apparently because HIBP users still run into them. That turned into a familiar complaint about anti-bot systems degrading the open web, blocking legitimate users, and pushing some buyers away from vendors that hide behind canned support replies. The mood around HIBP itself was mostly positive. Skepticism centered less on the service’s purpose than on Troy Hunt’s marketing tone and paid access model, with one line of criticism framing the API as selling people details about their own stolen data back to them.