The UK's war on anonymity has come to America

Most comments accepted the broad warning even when they pushed back on the headline. A lot of people said blaming the UK alone misses that the US already had state porn age-verification laws, a huge private surveillance industry, data brokers, Flock cameras, Ring doorbells, and a long record of trying to kill anonymity on its own. Where the discussion landed was sharper than that geography argument. The common view was that UK and US actors are feeding the same playbook, and the real driver is a coalition of politicians, NGOs, and large platforms that want a child-safety answer that preserves the current ad-tech and engagement-maximizing business model. The strongest practical thread was about implementation. Several commenters argued that not every law in the article does the same thing. They drew a line between direct website age verification and newer OS-level laws like California’s AB 1043 or Illinois proposals that make devices expose an age or age bracket to apps. Defenders of those bills said they are basically parental-control plumbing, not mandatory ID checks. Critics said that distinction is too comforting. Once every OS, app, and website speaks an age-signaling protocol, lawmakers have already built the rails for later verification and hardware attestation. That is why so many people kept coming back to client-side alternatives. The preferred model was site or app self-labeling of content and risk, with browsers and operating systems enforcing rules locally under parental control. That approach keeps age information from flowing to every service and addresses kids’ access without forcing adults into identification. Another thread cut through the child-safety framing entirely and said the real policy target should be the product design that harms both kids and adults. Infinite scroll, engagement algorithms, dark patterns, addictive notifications, and surveillance advertising came up again and again. In that framing, age verification is politically convenient because it lets Meta and others say the service is now “adult only” without changing the incentives that made it harmful in the first place. That view also explained why commenters were so worried about scope creep. They do not think the endpoint is just porn or social media. They think the endpoint is a general identity layer for reading, posting, and organizing online. The mood was alarmed, angry, and often cynical about both government and big tech. Even people who wanted stronger protections for children mostly rejected face scans, passport uploads, or third-party identity vendors as the answer. The few commenters defending stricter measures mostly argued from political reality. Parents are scared, social media has done real damage, and if privacy advocates do not offer something simple and legible, lawmakers will keep reaching for the bluntest surveillance tools available.